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Does law matter in the information environment? What can we
learn from the experience of applying a particular legal regime to
the online environment? Informational privacy (or to use the
European term, data protection) provides an excellent illustration
of the challenges faced by regulators who seek to secure user
rights and shape online behavior
A comprehensive study of Israeli website compliance with infor-
mation privacy regulation in 2003 and 2006 provides insights for
understanding these challenges. The study examined the informa-
tion privacy practices of 1360 active websites, determining the
extent to which these sites comply with applicable legal require-
ments related to information privacy and examining other
privacy-related practices. Information practices were explored on
three levels: first, we examined the legal requirements applicable
to each information practice under current Israeli law (legal
analysis); second, we analyzed the declared privacy policies
posted on each website; and third, we studied the actual informa-
tion practices of each website.
The findings show that only a small minority of websites comply
with legal requirements. Most websites do not provide privacy
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protection to users at the level required by the law.
Websites routinely collect personal data from users, although the
practice of collecting data is slightly lower among commercial
and organization websites than in other categories. Among pub-
lic and private sector websites, compliance was relatively low,
with 16% and 22% of websites that collect personal data giving
users some sort of notice. The popular and sensitive websites,
generally owned by large corporations, had substantially higher
levels of compliance, and the most popular websites had the
lowest number of violations.
The overall picture that emerges from the findings is one in
which the law seems to have only a relatively minor role in
shaping users' privacy experiences online, while other forces
and factors are clearly at play. The findings further suggest that
information privacy regulation is most effective among commer-
cial enterprises, which are better able to acquire legal advice
and respond to potential legal liability. It is less effective among
small enterprises and individual users who operate websites, be-
cause they typically cannot afford the somewhat sophisticated
legal counsel that is required for establishing and maintaining a
data protection policy. This is a troublesome conclusion, given
growing threats to user privacy in the Web 2.0 environment. As a
whole, the findings suggest that data protection regulators may
be unable to craft a single legal measure that fits the Internet.
Regulating the online behavior of various players may require
tailored regulatory measures.
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INTRODUCTION
The online environment increasingly provides us with "privacy
events."' These are situations that place privacy-related issues at the fore-
front of our daily lives, attract media attention, and cause an online buzz.
Online privacy events occur when user privacy is compromised in ways
that frustrate common expectations. The dynamics of each such event are
different. Some privacy events fade out with users adjusting to the new
situation. Other privacy events result in online civic resistance.2 An ap-
plication recently offered by Google, Google Buzz, is a clear example of
the latter. Users of Google's email service, Gmail, learned that they
were automatically added to a new social network composed of their
email and chat correspondents. Online friends included many business
contacts or others whom the users did not wish to befriend or publicly
reveal. Opting out of the service was possible, but as in many privacy
events, the invasion of privacy had already occurred. Public outcry fol-
lowed, and Google was forced to apologize and change its privacy
**4policies.
Privacy events draw much attention, and as Google Buzz illustrates,
social resistance can reverse encroachments on our privacy. However,
privacy threats are often more subtle than the Google Buzz example, and
can have more profound effects. Our individual privacy is regularly
compromised, by many websites, including those that do not make the
1. "Privacy events" is a take on "media events," a term discussed in DANIEL DAYAN
& ELIHU KATZ, MEDIA EVENTS: THE LIVE BROADCASTING OF HISTORY (1992).
2. Civic resistance to new privacy threats is not a new phenomenon. Alan Westin, in
his seminal 1967 work on privacy, documented such resistance to a proposal to add a religious
question to the census and to the introduction of a national identification system. ALAN
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 302-05 (1967); see also COLIN J. BENNETT, THE PRIVACY
ADVOCATES-RESISTING THE SPREAD OF SURVEILLANCE (2008) (examining the organization
and strategies of privacy advocates).
3. See generally GOOGLE Buzz, http://www.google.com/buzz (last visited Sept. I1,
2010).
4. See David Coursey, Google Apologizes for Buzz Privacy Issues, PC WORLD
(Feb. 15, 2010, 10:07 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/l89329/google
apologizes-for -buzz-privacy-issues.htmi. Google later faced a lawsuit and settled out of
court. See Damon Darlin, Google Settles Suit over Buzz and Privacy, BITS BLOG (Nov. 3,
2011, 12:19 AM), http:/Ibits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/google-settles-suit-over-buzz-
and-privacy.
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top of the most visited lists. These websites comprise the long tail, which
is the focus of our attention here.'
Certain non-legal mechanisms can affect online privacy and shape
the power of individuals to control their personal data. A website's tech-
nological architecture, or to use Lawrence Lessig's term, code, may
enable or disable particular forms of data collection, processing and sur-
veillance. For example, Google chose to include all of its Gmail users
automatically in the Google Buzz service by using an opt-out mecha-
nism that required active efforts by those who wish to be pulled "out."'
Changing default rules, especially those embedded in technology, is not
an obvious or easy task for many Google users.
Social norms also shape our online privacy. Our expectation of pri-
vacy in personal data may differ among individuals and between groups.
We may each hold a different perception regarding the meaning of pri-
vacy online and the extent to which our privacy is threatened by online
information flows. On one side is the view conveyed by the famous New
Yorker cartoon in which a dog tells another "[o]n the Internet, nobody
knows you're a dog."9 At the other extreme stands Scott McNealy, co-
founder of Sun Microsystems, who once announced in reference to the
Internet: "You have zero privacy anyway, get over it."'o In reality, we ex-
perience a more complex and nuanced privacy environment than either
of these views suggests, with many factors shaping our online privacy
and risks.
Finally, the law may also affect online privacy. Informational privacy
remains on the table of policymakers in the United States. As of the time
of this writing, the Obama administration is reconsidering its privacy
policies." What role does the law play in shaping our privacy online?
5. The "long tail" refers to the large number of websites that each attract only a small
number of users. The cumulative usages of these websites is substantial. For an introduction to
the idea of the long tail, see CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF Busi-
NESS Is SELLING LESS OF MORE (2006).
6. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE passim (1999).
7. See supra note 4.
8. Paul Schwartz, quoting Neal Stephenson, called this phenomenon the "blinking
twelve," referring to the common display on VCRs, which many users do not change. See
Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-
Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 743, 754 (2000).
9. Peter Steiner, On the Internet Nobody Knows You're a Dog, NEW YORKER, July 5,
1993, at 61, available at http://www.cartoonbank.com/1993/on-the-internet-nobody-knows-
youre-a-dog/invt/106197.
10. Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: 'Get Over It,' WIRED.COM (Jan. 26, 1999),
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538.
11. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE-A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS (2010), available at
http://ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf (proposing a new framework for addressing
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Various types of private ordering, including contracts, licenses, privacy
policies, bylaws and Terms of Use, define the rights and duties of the
parties involved regarding the collection and use of personal data. Public
ordering, namely, statutes and regulations, also affect online privacy by
setting limits on the use of personal data and informational surveillance,
also known as dataveillance.12 Legal jurisdictions take different ap-
proaches to online privacy. Some are comprehensive, such as the
European data protection regime, while others offer a narrower regula-
tory scheme tailored to address particular threats to online privacy,
namely the American model."
This Article addresses the role of the law in shaping online privacy.
Does law matter in the information environment? What can we learn
from the experience of applying a particular legal regime to the online
environment? The empirical study presented here (the "Privacy Study")
explores the efficacy of law in regulating online privacy and data protec-
tion.
Informational privacy (or, to use the European term, data protection)
provides an excellent illustration of the challenges faced by regulators
who seek to secure rights and shape the behavior of online users. The
appropriate limits in regulating online privacy are highly controversial,
providing the opportunity for valuable case studies exploring different
regulatory strategies. There is continuous debate among European and
American regulators and commentators regarding the proper understand-
ing of privacy in information.14 In the American model, privacy is
understood as a liberty, protecting citizens against the State. 5 In contrast,
the common European understanding is of a right to human dignity-an
individual right to determine the end uses of our personal data-in which
threats to privacy arise from both the State and the free market.6
commercial use of consumer data, composed of privacy by design, simpler consumer choices
and making data practices more transparent).
12. See Roger Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 CoMM. ACM 498
(1988).
13. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1230-32 (1998); discussion infra Part II.B.
14. See Ann Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization, and Gender, 34
U.S.F. L. REV. 633 (2000); Matthew A. Chivvis, Consent to Monitoring of Electronic Commu-
nications of Employees As an Aspect of Liberty and Dignity: Looking to Europe, 19 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 799 (2009); Kang, supra note 13, at 1230-32; Paul M.
Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on International Data Flows, 80
IOWA L. REV. 471 (1995); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999).
15. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
16. Id.; see also Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An An-
swer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1000-07 (1964) (refuting Prosser's claim that
no single thread connects common law privacy cases and identifying human dignity as the
341Spring 2011]
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The disagreement extends to the proper policies to be adopted. The
European approach is based on heavy regulation of any collection and
processing of personal information under the data protection regime. 7
On the other hand, the current American approach generally favors a
"hands off' position, except for particular kinds of data such as credit
information, health information, or data collected from children under
the age of thirteen. 8
The Privacy Study explored the question of whether it is constructive
to shape informational practices through regulation. A comprehensive
empirical study of information privacy practices of 1360 Israeli websites
showed a very low level of compliance with informational privacy regu-
lations. Furthermore, the Privacy Study explored the behavior of various
online actors and outlined differences in responses to these regulations.
By comparing the levels of compliance among different actors and ana-
lyzing differences in their responses to regulatory schemes, we are able
to identify circumstances where legal intervention could be effective and
also detect other forces that shape online behavior.
The Privacy Study explored the level of compliance of Israeli web-
sites with information privacy regulations in 2003 and 2006. The Israeli
online sphere provides an interesting case study. Although Israel enjoys a
high level of Internet penetration, its size offers a convenient laboratory
for a case study, at times enabling us to test the entire population of web-
sites rather than samples.' 9 Furthermore, the few studies that have
examined privacy practices targeted mostly American websites which
are subject to a thin, sectoral informational privacy regime.20 The Privacy
Study explored the efficacy of a thicker legal regime in regulating online
privacy, similar to the European data protection regime. This case study
thus provides a basis for comparative analysis with the studies of Ameri-
can websites.
The Privacy Study focused on two bedrock standards of any data
protection regime: notice and consent. Thus, the implications of our find-
unifying thread); Kang, supra note 13, at 1230-32 (arguing for a default rule regarding pri-
vacy based on dignity grounds).
17. See Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L
281) (EC) [hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
18. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) (regulating the
collection and use of financial data); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (regulating the collection and use of medical data); Children
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2006) (regulating the collec-
tion and use of data from children under the age of thirteen).
19. See Internet Usage Statistics of Countries Ranked by Penetration Rates, INTERNET
WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/list4.htm#high (last updated Mar. 31,
2009); infra note 117.
20. See infra Part II.B.
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ings go beyond any particular legal regime and may be relevant in vari-
ous jurisdictions. Information privacy practices were explored at three
levels: first, we examined the legal requirements that apply to each in-
formation practice (legal analysis); second, we analyzed the declared
privacy policies posted on each website; third, we studied the actual in-
formation practices of each website, focusing on data security. The
results showed a low level of compliance with the legal requirements.
The study further compared compliance with the legal requirements
among four clusters of websites: public, private, popular, and sensitive
websites.2 While compliance among public and private sector websites
was relatively low, the popular and sensitive websites had substantially
higher levels of compliance; the popular websites had the lowest number
of violations.
The overall picture that emerges from our findings is one in which
the law seems to play only a relatively minor role in shaping users'
online privacy experience, while other factors have a larger impact. The
findings further show that information privacy regulation is most effec-
tive in commercial enterprises and less effective in small enterprises or
individual user-operated websites. Consequently, the Privacy Study sug-
gests that data protection regulations should not approach the task with a
single legal measure that fits all players. Rather, regulating the online
behavior of various players may require segmented regulatory measures.
This Article proceeds in three parts. We begin by laying out the
foundations of privacy and data protection law in Part I. Part II provides
an overview of the empirical study, describing its methodology and pri-
mary findings. In addition, we discuss some methodological challenges
that might be relevant to similar empirical legal studies in other jurisdic-
tions. Finally, in Part IV, we discuss the ramifications of the findings for
policies aimed at promoting online informational privacy, and further
elaborate on the contribution of the Privacy Study to the understanding
of the limits of regulation in the online environment.
21. "Public websites" are operated by the government or public agencies, or operate
under a governmental license. "Private websites" are independently owned and managed by
private entities. "Popular websites" are drawn from a list of most frequently visited websites.
"Sensitive websites" are commercial sites that provide services usually considered to be pri-
vate, such as health or financial services. For the relevant definitions and discussion of these
categories, see infra Part III.
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I. PRIVACY AND INFORMATION PRIVACY REGULATION
A. Conceptions of Privacy
Privacy is both a social norm and a legal concept. These cultural
constructs are interdependent and evolve with changing technologies.
Perhaps the most uncontroversial statement regarding privacy is that it is
a contested concept. In order to provide the reader with background re-
garding informational privacy, we begin with a concise overview of the
theoretical map of privacy.
There are many conceptions of privacy, and the term is invoked to
cover a wide range of interests, such as the wish to remain secluded, the
power to prevent disclosure of private information, control over com-
mercial use of one's name and likeness, the desire not to be presented in
a false light, or the right to make intimate decisions without interfer-
ence.22 There are two principal understandings of the right to privacy in
personal data: privacy as a right to control data ("privacy as control")
and privacy as a right to prevent access ("privacy as access").23 Privacy
as control emphasizes a person's ability to control her data, activities and
24
any other aspect of her individual autonomy. Privacy as access empha-
sizes the border between the individual and others and empowers the
individual to prevent unwanted access. Ruth Gavison presented a com-
prehensive view of privacy as a concern over one's accessibility to
others, identifying three primary interests: "the extent to which we are
known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us,
22. For a well-known early discussion of privacy as seclusion, see Samuel Warren &
Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). For a discussion of pri-
vacy as control against unwanted disclosure, appropriation and false presentation, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1965) and William L. Prosser, Privacy (A Legal
Analysis), 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). For background on decisional privacy, see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY (1995).
23. For a discussion of privacy as control, see WESTIN, supra note 2, at 7. For a back-
ground on privacy as access, see Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the law, 89 YALE
L.J. 421, 428 (1980).
24. The idea of privacy as control is usually attributed to sociologist Alan Westin. See
WESTIN, supra note 2. This conception sometimes redefines privacy as property, though con-
trol and property do not necessarily overlap. For a discussion of the "privacy as property"
argument, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 228-30 (2006). This view is both un-
necessary and problematic. First, there is no need to conceptualize one fundamental human
right in terms of another right, especially the right to personal property, which in itself has
several differing conceptions. Second, once we equate privacy with property, it enables the
quick commodification of people, which contradicts the privacy interests. For criticism of the
privacy as property model, see Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and
the Subject as an Object, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1377-92 (2000) and Paul M. Schwartz,
Property, Privacy and Personal Data, I17 HARV. L. REv. 2055, 2076-94 (2004).
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and the extent to which we are the subject of others' attention."2 She
termed these interests secrecy, anonymity, and solitude.26
However, even within these two conceptions, privacy covers many
different interests. Moreover, once we focus on the threats to privacy,
another important distinction is apparent. A common threat to privacy,
like any other human right, lies with government. George Orwell's "Big
Brother" is the metaphor commonly used to describe this concern, pre-
senting privacy as a matter of liberty and protecting citizens vis-t-vis the
state.27 This view is primarily associated with the United States. 28 Other
jurisdictions are more likely to focus on threats posed by the market.
Various individuals and corporations maintain data on individuals.29 In
dividuals are thus both citizens of the state and data subjects. This threat
is relatively new, dating to the early 1970s, and is a product of the emer-
gence of computing and new business practices based on data
management, including the collection, processing and onward transfer of
personal data. 0 New developments in information technologies further
enhance the possibilities for capturing personal data, therefore multiply-
ing the concerns related to privacy. Moreover, the distributed online
environment weakens the traditional mechanism of enforcement by sov-
ereign states and also enhances the active collaboration between state
players and the private sector in collecting and processing information
on individual users." As we have argued elsewhere, this development
blurs the distinction between state actors and market players and intro-
duces a new category of threats to privacy.32
Articulating the threats to individual privacy requires a deeper and
broader basis than the concept of liberty. The fundamental value of hu-
man dignity provides such a basis. Human dignity is a fundamental
principle of some legal systems, such as those of Germany and Israel."'
25. Gavison, supra note 23, at 423. For current views of "privacy as access," applying
and updating Gavison's analysis to the digital environment, see Helen Nissenbaum, The
Meaning of Anonymity in an Information Age, 15 INFo. Soc'Y 141, 142 (1999), available at
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/paper-anonimity.html.
26. Gavison, supra note 23, at 428.
27. See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
28. See Whitman, supra note 15. The government is thus subject to constitutional limi-
tations on its powers. However, governmental cooperation with the market might bypass these
limitations. See Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6 (2003).
29. Schwartz, Property, supra note 24, at 2056-57.
30. For discussion of this threat in the Israeli context, see for example, Ministry of
Justice, Report of the Committee on Preventing Harm to Citizens by Data Stored in Com-
puters (1981) (Isr.).
31. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 28, at 3.
32. See id.
33. See GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [BASIC LAW FOR THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] [CONSTITUTION] May 8, 1949 (as amended through Dec.
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Several meanings are offered for dignity, but all share a set of Kantian
principles, according to which all persons should be treated as inviola-
ble.4 The understanding of privacy as a matter of dignity is often thought
of as a European view.35 Once privacy interests are understood in this
manner, it does not matter whether the source of the threat emanates
from the government or the market. The relevant idea is that each person
has the power to determine who may do what with his personal data.
Significantly, while the dignity conception of privacy can encompass
liberty interests, the opposite does not necessarily hold: the liberty con-
ception is generally narrower, in that it focuses mostly on the protection
of the citizen vis- -vis the state.
Today, we are witnessing the emergence of a third kind of threat:
one's peers. Adding a new "friend" to one's personal page on a social
network might expose the friend's information to third parties, enable
tagging of the friend's photos, and unfavorably alter the results of a
search engine query. Privacy law has not yet addressed this new threat
category.
The task of defining privacy is rendered almost impossible by the
broad range of interests covered by the term, divergent conceptions of
privacy, and the dynamic business, cultural, and technological environ-
ments in which the concept must interact. Daniel Solove thus suggests
that instead of searching for a core element of privacy, we should settle
for understanding it "as a set of protections against a plurality of distinct
but related problems."37 Accordingly, he offers a taxonomy of privacy,
divided into groups of harmful activities which the law should address,
including information collection, processing, dissemination and inva-
sion." Each category is further sub-divided. 9
1993), art. 1(1) ("Human dignity shall be inviolable."); Basic Law: Human Dignity and Lib-
erty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391, § 2 (Isr.) ("There shall be no violation of the life, body or
dignity of any person as such.").
34. For example, in the famous "census case," the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany, articulated a right to self-determination concerning personal data based on the no-
tion of human dignity. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
Dec. 15, 1983, 65 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] I (Ger.). For an
English-language summary, see Privacy, Property, Personality-Germany Case List, ARTS &
HUMAN. RES. COUNCIL, http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/personality/gercases.asp#Volksz%C3%
A4hlung (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
35. Whitman, supra note 15, at 1161.
36. This category of peer-surveillance is sometimes referred to as coveillance. See
Steve Mann et al., Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for Data
Collection in Surveillance Environments, I SURVEILLANCE & Soc'Y 331, 338 (2003).
37. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 171 (2008).
38. Id. at 101.
39. Id. at 103.
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Another way to organize the various aspects of privacy is to identify
categories of its subject matter. Privacy in "places" is one such category,
under the caveat that privacy belongs to people and not to places.4 Most
legal systems protect one's behavior in certain places, with the home as
the quintessential private place.4' The degree of protection varies, of
course, and is in any case not absolute. A second privacy category is pri-
vacy in communications; for example, wiretapping or opening someone
else's letters without permission are violations of privacy. Two other
categories, decisional privacy and informational privacy, are more con-
troversial as independent categories. Decisional privacy provides a
person with the power to make intimate decisions without governmental
interference. Examples include the decision to use contraception or to
42have an abortion. These rights are classified in American law as matters
of privacy, while in Europe (and Israel) the same interests are more
likely to be framed as matters of autonomy or dignity, related to privacy
yet understood as a separate legal principle. Helen Nissenbaum frames
the concept of privacy differently, calling it contextual integrity.4'3 Ac-
cording to this view, "privacy is neither a right to secrecy nor a right to
control but a right to appropriate flow of personal information."" The
appropriateness of the flow is determined, according to Nissenbaum, by
reference to the expectations of the people who engage in a specific so-
cial context.45
The last category-informational privacy-is also controversial.
Under this category, information about a person is a matter of privacy.
While American law protects only specific enumerated kinds of personal
data, European law protects all personal data, defined broadly as identi-
fying or identifiable data.46 This American-European legal divergence
reflects the ideological divide. The liberty conception of privacy protects
privacy interests, but it limits the protection to specific kinds of informa-
-47tion against governmental intrusions. The dignity conception of privacy
protects all kinds of personal information and provides protection
40. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
41. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36-38 (2001) (discussing the impor-
tance of the home to human activity).
42. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that the constitutional right to
privacy is broad enough to include a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that a law forbidding
the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy).
43. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE IN-
TEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 127 (2010).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 17, art. 2(a).
47. Id.
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against anyone or anything that may threaten it.48 This Article places the
dignity conception of informational privacy under the spotlight.
Regardless of what conception of privacy holds sway, privacy itself
is under constant attack from a coalition of stakeholders and various ide-
ologies. Law enforcement agencies often portray privacy as an obstacle
to national security; 49 freedom of speech and the press more generally
are limited by privacy;" feminists warn against reconstructing the pri-
vate/public divide;" economists argue that privacy is an obstacle for the
free flow of information which is crucial for proper functioning of a free
market.5 2 Finally, in connection with the latter critique, businesses are
interested in an uninhibited informational market that serves their mar-
51
keting and other business purposes.
The concept of privacy is complicated and troublesome, but it is
nevertheless adequate for the purposes of this Article. Within the frame-
work presented here, the current research focuses on the category of
privacy in information, examining a legal regime which purports to be
universal and comprehensive in the European model, a regime which is
better explained under the privacy as control conception of privacy, but
does not necessarily negate the alternative privacy as access conception.
We examined both governmental (and other public) websites and private
websites of various kinds in order to compare the two principal categori-
cal threats to informational privacy: the government and the market. The
practices fall within Solove's taxonomy under the headings of collection,
48. The theoretical gap that underlies the legal divergence creates a practical problem.
The ease with which information crosses borders makes it difficult to assure that the privacy
of citizens are protected as defined by applicable laws of a given jurisdiction. The EU at-
tempts to limit the transfer of personal data to jurisdictions that do not offer sufficient
protection. Thus, the U.S.-EU gap required a solution. This was devised in the form of a safe
harbor that enabled American firms to handle European personal data. See, e.g., Commission
Decision 2000/520, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7 (EC); U.S.-E.U. & Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks,
EXPORT.GOV, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor (last updated Mar. 31, 2011).
49. Privacy is viewed as a vehicle for protecting the secrecy of (sometimes illegal)
activity. Reducing privacy protection is perceived as a means for eliminating obstacles that
may interfere with the use of surveillance for law enforcement purposes. For further discus-
sion of these competing values see Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of
Balance, II J. POL. PHIL. 191 (2003).
50. For example, when the media joins the police while conducting arrests in homes,
privacy and free press conflict. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
51. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMI-
NISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw 93, 93 (1987).
52. For a pre-Intemet era economic analysis of privacy, see RICHARD A. POSNER, An
Economic Analysis of Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY
333 (Ferdinand David Schoemen ed., 1984).
53. For an argument explaining the business importance of collecting data, see FRED H.
CATE, PRIVACY IN PERSPECTIVE 10-17 (2001).
Does Law Matter Online?
processing, and dissemination of information.54 Framed in Nissenbaum's
thesis, the law is insensitive to the particular social contexts.5
B. The Legal Layer
The American liberty and the European dignity conceptions of pri-
vacy translate into two distinct legal regimes. The law of the United
States protects individual privacy interests against governmental en-
croachment even though privacy is not mentioned in the Constitution,
but does not provide a general, universal right to privacy in other con-
texts. Instead, U.S. federal law provides a set of legal regulations tailored
to several sectors. Examples include the Fair Credit Reporting Act of
1970 (FCRA), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 (HIPAA), and the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of
1998 (COPPA).16 This sectoral approach provides informational privacy
protection in enumerated activities, but has a far narrower scope than a
general legal privacy regime."
The European dignity view of privacy provides such a general right
to privacy. 8 The general right is particularized in regional and local in-
struments. Within the Council of Europe, the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Per-
sonal Data ("Convention 108") provides a principled framework for
regulating privacy." Within the European Union, Directive 46/95/EC
provides a detailed regulatory mechanism.6 As the titles of these instru-
ments indicate, the main privacy category is that of informational
privacy, or, to use the European terminology, data protection.
The European legal mechanisms are part of a larger picture. Begin-
ning in the early 1980s, the enactment of a series of international
instruments-generally "soft law" declarations and guidelines-
addressed the regulation of personal data, including transborder transfers
54. See SOLOVE, supra note 37.
55. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 43.
56. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2006); Children Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2006) (regulating the online collection and
processing of data from children under the age of thirteen).
57. Several American scholars advocate the recognition of a general category of infor-
mational privacy in the U.S. See Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94
GEO. L.J. 1087, 1087 (2006).
58. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1,
10; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
59. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing
of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108. The Convention is also open to countries
which are not members of the Council.
60. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 17.
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(within the EU, the Directive is mandatory, and thus "hard law"). These
instruments include the OECD's Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data of 1980;61 the 1990 UN Guide-
lines Concerning Computerized Data Files;62 the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework of 2004;6' and a series of dec-
larations by a group of national data protection commissioners in 2005
and onwards." Viewed together, these legal instruments form the founda-
tions of an emerging global data protection regime.
This emerging regime, comprising such sources as the OECD
Guidelines, the CoE Convention, the EU Directive, and U.S. federal laws
that provide privacy protections, exhibits strikingly similar standards
derived from the same core principles. 6 These principles can be under-
stood under either the control or access conceptions of privacy, conform
with both the liberty and dignity models, and fit nicely within Solove's
privacy taxonomy.6 The set of principles relates to personal data, which
can be defined in various ways.6" The resulting legal mechanisms impose
several duties on those who collect, process, and transfer such data, ac-
cord certain rights to data subjects, and includes various means of
enforcement.
The core principles are notice, choice, limited use, access and recti-
fication, confidentiality, and data security. Some jurisdictions and legal
61. OECD, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data (1980), http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_11
1,00.html.
62. Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, G.A. Res.
44/132, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/132, at 211 (Dec. 5, 1989).
63. ELEC. COMMERCE STEERING GRP., AsIA-PAC. EcoN. COOPERATION, APEC PRIVACY
FRAMEWORK 8-19 (2004), available at http://www.apec.org/en/Press/News-Releases/2005/
-/media/Files/Press/NewsRelease/2005/04_amm_014rev l.ashx.
64. See, e.g., Montreux Declaration: The Protection of Personal Data and Privacy in a
Globalised World: A Universal Right Respecting Diversities, 27TH INTERNATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONERS (2005), http://www.
privacyconference2005.org/fileadmin/PDF/montreux declaratione.pdf; Resolution on Inter-
national Co-operation, 29TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF DATA PROTECTION AND
PRIVACY COMMISSIONERS (2007), http://www.privacyconference2007.gc.ca/Resolution%
20on%20Global%20cooperation%20-English.pdf; Resolution on Privacy by Design, 32ND
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONERS (2010),
http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/F8A79347-170C-4EEF-AOAD- I 55554558A5F/26502/
ResolutiononPrivacybyDesign.pdf.
65. Michael D. Birnhack, The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global
Regime, 24 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REP. 508, 508 (2008).
66. See id. at 511.
67. See SOLOVE, supra note 37, at 171.
68. One way to define "personal data" is to list the kinds of data that are considered
personal. This is the current approach of the Israeli law. See Privacy Protection Act, 5741-
1981, 1011 LSI 128, § 7 (1980-81) (Isr.). Another way is to define "personal data" in a gen-
eral manner; this is the approach taken in the European Union. See Data Protection Directive,
supra note 17, art. 2(a); Kang, supra note 13, 1206-08 (1998).
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frameworks contemplate additional core principles, such as a relevance
requirement found in the EU Directive (referred to therein as the quality
and proportionality principles),9 or additional enforcement-related prin-
ciples. 70 Given that these principles are stated as general standards and
do not in themselves contain sufficient instructions, they require particu-
larization. The implementation and interpretation of these principles
vary, but they create common ground to facilitate the international flow
of personal data. Instead of drawing a broad range of possible implemen-
tation strategies, we shall turn to the Israeli data protection regime,
which encompasses most of these core principles and serves as the case
study for the Privacy Study discussed in this Article.
C. Israeli Informational Privacy Regulation
The Privacy Study examined compliance of websites with the Israeli
privacy law. The Israeli informational privacy regime is more closely
related to the European model of data protection than to the thin sectoral
regime in the United States.7' The European model provides a general
right to informational privacy in a detailed regulatory regime, imposing a
series of duties upon processors of personal data.72
Privacy is considered a fundamental human right under Israeli law
and is guaranteed by section 7(a) of the Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty, which declares that "[a]ll persons have the right to privacy
and to intimacy."" Privacy was also protected before the enactment of
the Basic Law in 1992, in the Privacy Protection Act of 1981 (PPA).74
The PPA, a product of several expert committees in the 1970s and early
1980s, was one of the first privacy laws of its kind in the world.
The statute achieves a comprehensive scope, addressing various cate-
gories of privacy, including privacy in places, in communications,
69. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 17, art. 6.
70. See id. art. 28 (requiring Member States to establish a supervisory authority).
71. See Whitman, supra note 15, at 1193.
72. See supra Part I.
73. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 (Isr.).
74. Privacy Protection Act, 5741-1981, 1011 LSI 128 (1980-81) (Isr.).
75. The overall Act is based on recommendations of the Cohen committee, chaired by
Supreme Court Justice and later Chief Justice Yizhak Cohen. See Ministry of Justice, Commit-
tee on the Protection from Harm to the Privacy of the Individual (1976) (Isr.). Other members
of the committee included Aharon Barak, later the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Profes-
sor Ruth Gavison, and Dr. Gabriel Kling. The second committee focused on databases, and its
recommendations provided the basis for Chapter 2 of the PPA. It was chaired by Knesset
Member David Glass. See Ministry of Justice, Report of the Committee on Preventing Harm
to Citizens by Data Stored in Computers (1981) (Isr.). A third committee, chaired by Haim
Klugman of the Ministry of Justice, formed the basis of Chapter D of the PPA, which regu-
lates governmental and public data transfers. See Ministry of Justice, The Committee on
Transferring Data Between Public Bodies (1982) (Isr.).
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and-significantly for the current debate and our research-
informational privacy under various provisions, including a detailed
chapter dedicated to databases. Israeli law thus long ago chose the
European understanding of privacy. The so-called "constitutional revolu-
tion" of 1992, which emphasized the centrality of human dignity as a
foundational concept in Israeli law, strengthened the European orienta-
tion which was already present in Israeli privacy law.
Chapter B of the PPA forms a five-prong regulatory regime. First, it
requires registration of certain databases with the Database Registrar.8 A
database is defined, with some exclusions, as any non-manual collection
of data. 9 Several factors can trigger the registration duty: the number of
data subjects contained in the database (exceeding 10,000 subjects); the
kind of data (when the data is sensitive, as defined in section 7, referring
to data content in several situations); the source of the data (when the
source is not with the data subject); the owner of the data (a public
body); and the purpose of the data collection (direct marketing).
Second, the PPA mandates regulation by the Database Registrar. The
PPA provides the Registrar with certain powers, including discretion to
refuse the registration of a database."' If a required registration is refused,
the database is considered illegal and its operation should be prohibited.8 2
The Registrar also has some investigatory powers and the legal authority
to impose fines."
Third, the law imposes a series of duties on database owners or their
operators. The PPA requires a database owner to notify the data subject
when collecting data to be kept in the database.4 The notice requirement
is central to our study, as it requires an explicit statement addressed to
the subject. Section 11 reads:
A request to a person for information with a view to keeping and
use thereof in a database shall be accompanied by a notice indi-
cating-
76. See Privacy Protection Act, 5741-1981, 1011 LSI 128, §§ 7-171(1980-81) (Isr.).
77. For a general discussion of the Constitutional Revolution, see Daphne Barak-Erez,
From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in American Perspective,
26 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 309, 311 (1995). For its implications for privacy, see HCJ
8070/98 ACRI v. Ministry of Interior, 58(4) PD 842 [2004] (lsr.)
78. See Privacy Protection Act, §§ 8-9 (Isr.).
79. Id. § 7.
80. Id. § 8(c).
81. Id. § 10(a)(1).
82. Id. §§ 8(a)(1), 10(b)(2).
83. Id. § 10(e)-(f).
84. Id. § 11.
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(1) whether that person is under a legal duty to deliver that in-
formation or whether its delivery depends on his volition and
consent;
(2) the purpose for which the information is requested;
(3) to whom the information is to be delivered and the purposes
of such delivery.""
Notice is thus a prerequisite for consent, reflecting the underlying
theories of privacy as either control or access. As indicated by the PPA's
notice requirements, Israeli privacy law is based on a principle of con-
sent. If an internet user consents to an act that would otherwise amount
to a violation of her privacy, then consent eliminates the harm.6 Consent
should be informed, but can be either explicit or implicit.7
Where the user is unaware of the prospective uses of the data, it is
meaningless to say that she has consented to data collection. Once she
freely consents, based on her understanding of prospective uses, to pro-
vide the requested data, she has given informed consent. Providing
information based on a true choice means that the data subject has exer-
cised control over her privacy; it means that the person actively
permitted access to her person. Thus, notice is not a mere technical duty.
Rather, it reflects the most basic understanding of privacy as dignity.
Whether viewed under the privacy as control model (where the data sub-
ject exercises control over the elements of her privacy) or the privacy as
access model (where the subject allows access to her data), the presence
of informed consent is the key distinguishing factor between personal
and external control of personal data.
Consent does have limits. The consent model may fail when the
party asking for data and the data subject have unequal power vis-h-vis
each other. The employment context is a common example." A second
consent-failure scenario occurs when data subjects fail to comprehend
the notice provided, thus failing to make a meaningful choice.89
Significantly, the PPA does not state exactly how notice should be
given: the proper location, wording, visibility, and comprehensibility of
notice are left to the data collector's judgment. Consistent with the
85. Id.
86. See id.§ 1.
87. Id. § 3.
88. A recent decision by the Israeli National Labor Court set rules for employee privacy
in the workplace. See Labor Appeal 90/08 Issakov-Inbar v. State of Israel (2011) (Isr.). The
opinion is based on the notion of unequal power of the employee and the employer.
89. See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CON-
SUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION EcONOMY' 341 (Jane K. Winn ed.,
2006) (providing a critical analysis of consent and its limits).
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purposive approach to legal interpretation undertaken by Israeli courts,"
the notice duty should be read to achieve the purpose of the PPA as indi-
cated by its name-protection of privacy. Further, the PPA must be
interpreted in light of general principles of the Israeli legal system, such
as the fundamental duty of good faith which applies to all actions subject
to private law-a general duty of fairness throughout public law.9' More-
over, the notice duty has a close kinship to the law of consumer
protection, which requires businesses to be transparent about their con-
92sumer practices.
Database owners and operators also have explicit duties to keep data
confidential and to provide data security. 93 The latter duty is generally
stated, but accompanying regulations provide more specific rules.94
Fourth, the database owner is obligated to respect the rights of the
data subjects. These rights are explicitly granted to data subjects under
the PPA.9' The PPA allows the subject to access his personal data held in
the database.96 There are some qualifications to this right, including ex-
ceptions when the data relates to the subject's mental health and the
database owner believes that disclosure might harm the person, and res-
ervations based on national security and law enforcement needs.97 The
PPA further allows the data subject to require the amendment or deletion
of incorrect, inadequate, or outdated data.98 Moreover, the data subject
has rights correlating to the duties imposed on the database owner re-
garding notice, confidentiality, and data security.9
Notably, other than the notice requirement, the other rights and du-
ties (confidentiality, data security duties, access, and rectification rights),
if properly observed, do not require that the data subject be informed
thereof." In other words, only the notice duty mandates that information
90. See Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democ-
racy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 28 (2002) (explaining that a judge's role is to "understand the
purpose of law in society and to help the law achieve its purpose").
91. For a discussion of the principle of good faith in Israeli private law, see CA 9/82
Beit Yules Ltd. v. Raviv Moshe & Co., 43(1) PD 441 [1989] (lsr.). For background on the
fairness principle in Israeli administrative law, see HCJ 164/97 Kontram Ltd. v. Ministry of
Fin.-Customs Dep't, 52(1) PD 289, 316 [1998] (lsr.).
92. See Consumer Protection Act, 5741-1981, 1023 LSI 248 (1981) (Isr.).
93. Privacy Protection Act, 5741-1981, 1011 LSI 128, §§ 16-17 (1980-81) (lsr.).
94. See Privacy Protection Regulations (Conditions for Holding Data and Protecting It,
and Arrangements for Transferring Data Between Public Bodies), 1986, 4931 KT 858 (Isr.)
(discussing conditions for data storage and transfer of information among public agencies).
95. Privacy Protection Act, §§ 13-15 (Isr.).
96. Id. § 13.
97. Id. § 13(e).
98. Id. § 14.
99. For example, the data subject can sue the database owner or operator for failing to
perform duties under the PPA. Id. § 31B.
100. See id. § 11.
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be conveyed to the data subject before obtaining the subject's data.'o' Of
course, a court might reach the conclusion that in order to fulfill the re-
quirement of informed consent, additional information is needed, but to
date no court has ruled to this effect.
The fifth prong is enforcement. The PPA invests the Database Regis-
trar with investigative powers, limited prosecution powers, and the
authority to deny registration in some cases. 02 The Act also creates
causes of actions for data subjects; a violation of the duties imposed on
the collecting party or the denial of rights afforded to data subjects is
both a criminal offense and a tort. 03
In practice, the five-prong regulatory regime described above is far
from perfect. There is a general consensus among data protection agen-
cies (including the Registrar) and privacy experts that the regulatory
registration system has failed. '0 An Expert Committee report ("Schoff-
man Report") estimated that only two percent of all databases are
registered.' 5 Enforcement is also lacking, and very few data subjects
have initiated proceedings under Chapter B of the PPA.'" This situation
led to the appointment of an expert committee chaired by Israel's Deputy
Attorney General.1o' In 2007, the committee recommended a series of
amendments to the PPA, including a major limitation on the registration
duty, a strengthening of substantive duties imposed on databases, the
strengthening of data subjects' rights, and a series of incentives to en-
force these recommendations, including new statutory damage and class
action provisions.'o As of the time of publication of this Article, the rec-
ommendations have not yet materialized into actual amendments, but
these are expected within the foreseeable future.
Another important development in Israeli data protection involves
the establishment by the Ministry of Justice of a new agency, the Israeli
101. See id.
102. Id. § 101(A)(1).
103. Id. § 31. An expert committee also recommended enhancing the Registrar's powers
in addition to enabling class actions and statutory damages. See Ministry of Justice, Commit-
tee for the Examination of Legislation Relating to Databases, 42-43 (2007) (Isr.) [hereinafter
Schoffman Report], available at http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/BilDI9EE-7FCO-
42ED- B2F5-2B4FDEE66BD4/18343/SchoffmanReportl.pdf.
104. See id. at 26. The Schoffman Report recommended limiting the registration duty.
Id. at 35. In the interest of disclosure, one of the authors, Michael Birnhack, was a member of
the committee. See Omer Tene, Israeli Data Protection Law: Constitutional, Statutory and
Regulatory Reform, 8 PRIVACY & DATA PROTECTION 6 (2007) (reviewing recent changes in
Israeli data protection law and assessing its adequacy under European standards).
105. Schoffman Report, supra note 103, at 8.
106. Id. at 7.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 8-9.
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Law Information Technology Agency (ELITA).'" In late 2009, the pro-
fessional data protection unit of the EU recommended a declaration that
Israel maintains an adequate data protection regime,"o and in January of
2011, the European Commission accepted the recommendation."' The
declaration would streamline data transfers between the EU and Israel
while maintaining a high level of privacy protection.12
In sum, the Israeli data protection regime is aligned with the Euro-
pean privacy standards and includes a complex and detailed legal regime
for the regulation of personal data. The most important provision is the
notice requirement, which mandates that certain information be given to
the data subject before collecting data. The information must include
whether there is a duty to provide data, the purpose of the data collec-
tion, to whom it will be transferred, and for what purposes."' The notice
requirement does not cover information about other duties acting on the
database holder or other rights of the data subject. Any additional infor-
mation conveyed thus exceeds the legal requirements of the PPA,
although there is no prohibition on providing such information. The legal
contours of the notice requirement enable us to examine both whether
database holders comply with the law (i.e., the notice requirement), and




The Privacy Study explored the information privacy practices of
websites and the extent to which they comply with applicable legal re-
quirements related to information privacy. Previous studies exploring
these practices in various jurisdictions examined specific categories of
websites (i.e., children's or health websites) or a limited number of
109. See About the Israeli Law, Information and Technology Authority, MINISTRY OF
JusT., http://www.justice.gov.il/MOJEng/ILITA/About.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
110. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 6/2009 on the Level of
Protection of Personal Data in Israel, 02316/09/EN, WP 165 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wpl65_en.pdf.
Ill. See Commission Decision, 2011/61/EU, 2011 O.J. (L 27) 39, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eulLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?ui=OJ:L:2011:027:0039:0042:EN:PDF.
112. Note that the adequacy finding does not mean that the laws are identical. Indeed,
the Israeli data regime lacks an explicit data quality and proportionality requirement. Thus, a
data collector may state any legal purpose for collection and may, upon notice, collect data in
excess of that needed for the immediate intended purpose. See Omer Tene, Is Israeli Data
Protection 'Adequate' Under Article 25?, PRIVACY & DATA PROTECTION, Apr.-May 2008, at
9, 10.
113. Privacy Protection Act, 5741-1981, 1011 LSI 128, § 11 (1980-81) (lsr.).
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popular websites."4 The purpose of the Privacy Study was to provide a
comprehensive picture of a particular regime and to track the differences
in compliance levels with information privacy regulation in different sec-
tors.
We hypothesized the presence of a substantial gap between legal re-
quirements and information privacy practices. Based on the results of
our 2003 Study, our subjective impressions, and our familiarity with the
Israeli privacy community's views, as well as the European privacy dis-
course, we assumed that only a few websites conform to the law. We also
predicted a high level of deviation in compliance with different legal
rules. Finally, we assumed that different sectors (e.g., the public and pri-
vate sectors) as well as particular sub-categories of websites would
manifest different levels of compliance.
Information practices were explored at three levels: first, as dis-
cussed in Part II, we examined the legal requirements which apply to
each information practice under current Israeli law (legal analysis); sec-
ond, we analyzed the declared privacy policies posted on each website;
and third, we studied the actual information practices of each website.
The study focused on 1360 Israeli websites active from 2006 to
2007."' The Israeli online sphere provides a unique case study for two
reasons. First, the few studies that have examined privacy practices of
websites in other jurisdictions studied mostly American and English
websites.H6 The current study explores the efficacy of the denser Euro-
pean-style legal regime in regulating online privacy, thus providing a
basis for comparative analysis with studies of American websites.
Second, notwithstanding Israel's relatively high Internet penetration
rate, the relatively small population size enabled us to study the entire
population for some categories of websites.' 7
114. See, e.g., COMPLIANCE CHECK PROJECT, STUDY OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE DATA
PROTECTION ACT 1998 BY UK BASED WEBSITES (2002), available at http://www.
privacydataprotection.co.uk/pdf/websiteccompliance report.pdf; JOSEPH TUROW, PRIVACY
POLICIES ON CHILDREN'S WEBSITES: Do THEY PLAY BY THE RULES? (Annenberg Pub. Policy
Ctr., Report Ser. No. 38, 2001), available at http://www.asc.upenn.edulusr/jturow/
Privacy%20Report.pdf.
115. The study was performed in 2006 by a team of law students. Inter-coder reliability
was examined and consistency was achieved. All forms completed by the examiners were
forwarded to the Statistics Consultants. Data was coded and ambivalent data was marked and
addressed individually.
116. See, e.g., COMPLIANCE CHECK PROJECT, supra note 114, at 5; TUROW, supra note
114, at 2.
117. The Internet penetration rate in Israel is one of the highest in the world, reaching
over seventy-five percent as of March 2009. See Internet Usage Statistics, supra note 19. A
country's Internet penetration rate is the ratio between the aggregate number of Internet users
speaking a language and the total estimated population of speakers of that language. Internet
World Users By Language, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.intemetworldstats.com/
stats7.htm (last updated Mar. 26, 2011).
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We defined "Israeli websites" using a formal two-part test to assure
that the websites are subject to Israeli law. Thus, we studied only web-
sites that were: (1) registered under the Israeli Country Code Top Level
Domain (ccTLD) (<.il>), and among these, 2) registered up to the third-
level domain name (3LD)."' The rationale for the first test is that the
uniqueness of the Hebrew language makes it unlikely that a foreign firm
would register its non-Israeli website with an Israeli ccTLD."9 We as-
sumed that Hebrew websites registered in Israel are owned and operated
by local citizens or firms and organizations that operate in Israel, and are
therefore uncontroversially subject to Israeli law.' 20 The second test's
limitation to third-level domain names assured that fourth-level domain
names are in most cases internal pages of the main website registered
under the parent, 3LD website. 121
In order to explore whether the rules carry a different impact on dif-
ferent types of online players, we studied four categories of websites:
public websites, private websites, popular websites, and sensitive web-
sites.
Public websites. Public websites consist of the following categories:
gov.il (government and governmental agencies), ac.il (academic institu-
tions), muni.il (municipal authorities), k12.il (elementary schools and
kindergartens), and net.il (Internet Service Providers-ISPs).2 2 Public
law principles apply directly to the gov.il, muni.il and k12.il public
schools; academic institutions are either public organizations subject to
administrative law or universities and colleges that courts subject to pub-
118. Le., the study covered ynet.co.il, but not ynet.co.il/culture or culture.ynet.co.il.
119. These websites are registered with the Israeli Chapter of the Internet Society
(ISOC-IL), a private, non-profit organization responsible for the registration of the <.il> do-
main names. See Domain Registration, ISR. INTERNET Ass'N, http://www.isoc.org.ill
domains/registration.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
120. Some Israeli entrepreneurs, however, may have registered their websites under non-
Israeli domain names, such as .com. These websites might also be subject to Israeli law, but
were not part of the current research.
121. This choice is also dictated by a statistical limitation, as the number of domain
names in 3LD is known (due to ISOC's allocation process), but the number of internal pages
or sub-sites is unknown.
122. See Domain Registration, IsR. Gov'T TECH, http://www.itpolicy.gov.il/registrar/
gov-l.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). ISOC-IL rules for domain name allocations assure that
most of these are indeed "public websites," i.e., that they belong to public organizations or are
of a public nature and subject to the same legal regime. <gov.il> 3LD is allocated by the Min-
istry of Finance. Id. For a listing of the allocation rules, see Rules for the Allocation of
Domain Names, ISR. INTERNET Ass'N (Aug. 2010), http://www.isoc.org.il/domains/il-domain-
rules.html. (<ac.il> is allocated to accredited academic institutions, after consultation with the
Council for Higher Education. <muni.il> is allocated to municipal bodies, according to the
official list published by the Central Bureau of Statistics. <kl2.il> is allocated to kindergar-
tens and schools as classified by the Ministry of Education. <net.il> is allocated to ISPs who
are licensed by the Ministry of Communications).
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lic law norms.123 The ISPs were classified as "public" since they act un-
der a governmental license and are subject to that extent to public law.
Overall, 497 public websites were reviewed, constituting the entire
population of these websites. We were also able to provide a temporal
analysis by comparing current data to a prior study of public websites
conducted in 2003 ("The 2003 Study").124
Private sector websites. The largest population of websites is that of
commercial websites within the SLD (Second Level Domain) <co.il>,125
and the second largest consists of <org.il> websites.12 6 The co.il domain
level is often a default category-i.e., if the party interested in register-
ing the domain does not qualify for any other categories, it will register
under the co.il group. Websites in this category are often operated by
individual users or small businesses. Websites in the SLD <org.il> cate-
gory include nonprofit organizations, non-governmental organizations,
and individuals active in civil society. Each website is independently
127owned and managed by its owners. A representative sample of ran-
domly selected active websites was reviewed.12
123. Administrative law applies directly to public entities such as statutory bodies or
governmental agencies. However, Israeli case law has extended the reach of administrative
law so it also applies to some private bodies that perform public functions. These are known
as bodies of "dual normativity," meaning that they are subject to both private and public
norms. This Israeli doctrine is broader than the American "state action" doctrine. The Israeli
Supreme Court also applied the dual normativity doctrine to universities. See, e.g., AdminA
7151/04 Technion v. Dats 59(6) PD 433 [2005] (Isr.) (explaining the legal status of public
universities as subject to certain common law rules of administrative law).
124. See Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, Protection of Privacy on Israeli Public
Websites, Burda Center for Innovative Communications (2004), http://burdacenter.bgu.ac.ill
publications/finalReports2003-2004/BirnhackElkin-Koren.pdf.
125. The count was 77,079 commercial website domain names of a total 89,725 regis-
tered domain names at the time of our research. The data was provided to us for the purpose
of the Privacy Study by the Israeli Internet Society, which administers the ccTLD <.il>.
126. The count was 6289 registered domain names at the time of our research. The data
was provided by the Israeli Internet Society, which also administers the ccTLD <.il>.
127. In some cases, a single entity may own several domain names and run several web-
sites. However, our research unit was the website, rather than the owners thereof.
128. In order to ascertain the statistical significance of the sample and to ensure that it
was randomly chosen, we had to know the size of the population, i.e., how many registered
domain names were active at the time of the research. Apparently, many of the registered do-
main names had no active website. There is no official verified data about the number of
active and inactive websites. Prior to performing our research, we estimated that up to a third
of registered domain names are inactive, in the sense that their associated websites lack con-
tent. ISOC administrators shared our estimate. As indicated below, these estimates turned out
to be rather modest-the actual number of inactive domain names was much higher. Hence,
we expanded the initial draw of domain names: a random list of 1000 domains in <co.il>
(commercial domains) and <org.il> SLD was provided by ISOC-IL. We then examined which
domains had affiliated active websites. We repeated the process several times and identified
190 <org.il> and 736 <co.il> active websites. This provided a large enough group to validate
the sample.
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Most popular websites. Previous studies of online privacy policies
conducted in other jurisdictions explored similar issues but were limited
to popular or sensitive websites. 2 9 Needless to say, the privacy practices
of these websites are of special interest due to the volume of website
activity. The study reviewed the practices and policies of forty-five
Israeli websites listed as the most popular at the time of the research. 30
Unlike the other groups that either covered the entire population of web-
sites in their respective categories or constituted a random sample, this
group was selected according to a pre-determined criterion: popularity.
Thus, on an imagined curve of website popularity, the most popular
websites are located at the beginning of the curve rather than the long
tail."'
Sensitive websites. The last category of websites likely collects sen-
sitive data from users. We compiled a list of 120 websites which, based
on our analysis of their content, clearly engage in collecting and/or proc-
essing sensitive information. Sensitive websites were selected in six
different categories: e-commerce, gambling, information/communication,
dating, financial services, and health. The four examined categories of
websites are listed in Table 1.'32
129. See, e.g., COMPLIANCE CHECK PROJECT, supra note 114, at 7; SA Websites Fail
the Privacy Test, ALLAFRICA (Sept. 4, 2003), http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/
200309050006.html; Top UK Sites 'Fail Privacy Test,' BBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2003), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3307705.stm.
130. The list was compiled based on the results of an omnibus survey commissioned
from a market research service (Teleseker Inc.), from April 2-10, 2006, among two represen-
tative samples of the population of adults and teenagers aged twelve to eighteen, regarding
their surfing preferences. Telesekr Omnibus Research (Apr. 2006) (on file with authors). The
survey produced an initial list of 135 websites, from which some websites were omitted (i.e.,
foreign sites in <.com>, <.net> TLDs, unidentified websites, or those selected twice, once by
each group).
131. See ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 25 (illustrating the long tail curve as it applies to
song popularity on one internet music subscription service).
132. In each category, there were some websites which were "inactive," "under con-
struction," or redirected users to another website that had already been examined. These
websites were classified "rejected." There is a particularly large group of rejected websites
under the subcategory of <.net.il>. While visiting these websites during the research, we real-
ized that ISPs in particular tend to register several domains that redirect users to a single
website. Thus, except for the main active domain, all duplicate domains were rejected.




Type of Website SLD Source No. Examined
Public Websites muni.il 2003 Study & independent 75
update
gov.il Tehila & complementary search 80
k12.il 2003 Study & independent 39
update
ac.il 2003 Study & independent 68
update
net.il 2003 Study & independent 19
update
Sub-total 281
Commercial Websites org.il ISOC-IL random composition & 190
activity filtering
co.il ISOC-IL random composition & 726
activity filtering
Popular Websites co.il Survey by TeleSeker 45
Sensitive Website Free Internet Content based selection: 118
search & sensitive personal data
Aladdin
Total 1360
The information practices of each website were analyzed individu-
ally in order to determine the level of compliance with legal
requirements, using a detailed questionnaire based on the PPA. The
questionnaire contained three sets of questions. The first aimed at identi-
fying websites subject to the duties defined by the PPA. As discussed in
Part II, the PPA imposes duties on collectors of personal data and grants
rights to data subjects regarding their data. The first set of questions was
aimed at identifying the data at stake, determining whether it is collected
and/or preserved, and determining how the data is used.
A second set of questions aimed examined "hard compliance," i.e.,
whether statements made on the website meet the PPA's formal notice
requirement and whether the website disclosures go beyond that formal
legal requirement.' The goal was to determine whether factors unrelated
to the law were at work. For instance, our 2003 Study found that some
133. See Privacy Protection Act, 5741-1981, 1011 LSI 128, § 11 (1980-81) (Isr.). For
instance, a website may declare its practices regarding the right of the data subject to access
her personal data stored with the website, even though the PPA only requires the data collec-
tor to enable access and does not require the data collector to notify the data subject thereof.
362 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 17:337
websites provided information about their data security measures even in
cases where it seemed information disclosure was not required.
A third set of questions explored "soft compliance," i.e., actual prac-
tices of the websites, such as the visibility of the privacy policy, the title
used for the policy, and other factors.
B. Personal Data Collection Practices
The Privacy Study also identified websites that collected personal
data, as defined by law.' Such websites are subject to a variety of legal
duties. Some of the PPA's duties are triggered when personal data is col-
lected for the purpose of storage in a database as defined by the PPA.3 6
This definition excludes databases intended for purely private use and
those including only the name, address and means of communications
("contact information"), which in themselves do not characterize the
data in a way that violates privacy rights.3 7 Thus, we studied websites to
identify those that collect personal data, likely held in a database, as de-
fined under the PPA.
Some websites explicitly require personal data as a precondition for
accessing or surfing the website. In other cases, acquiring goods or ser-
vices involves the submission of personal data (e.g., credit card number,
contact information, search queries, or publishing comments). We there-
fore defined websites that collect personal data as follows: any website
that provides commercial products or services that require online pay-
ment, provides interactive services that record user inputs (search
engines, chat rooms, forums, and online games), or requires the user to
provide personal data beyond mere communications data.
Another set of questions sought to identify the types of data col-
lected by the websites in order to exclude from the research those
databases that are not subject to duties defined by the PPA (i.e., those
that contain only contact information). We isolated those websites that
required personal data (e.g., identification number, age, profession, in-
come, credit card or real estate information) for obtaining a username
134. Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 28, at 19.
135. Privacy Protection Act, § 7 (lsr.) (defining "information," the equivalent of "per-
sonal data," to include "data on personality, personal status, intimate affairs, state of health,
economic position, vocational qualification, [and] opinions and beliefs of a person").
136. See id. (defining "database" as "a collection of data, kept by magnetic or optic
means and intended for computer processing" and listing exceptions).
137. See id. ("'[lnformation' means data on the personality, personal status, intimate
affairs, state of health, economic position, vocational qualification, opinion and beliefs of a
person.").
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and password or for accessing website content. These websites collect
personal data as defined in the PPA, and hence trigger regulation.'
Finally, we examined the feasibility of providing false personal data
in order to obtain a username. In such cases, the de facto threat to pri-
vacy is less severe, since users aware of this possibility can gain access
to the website without disclosing their personal data.
The findings are presented in Table 2.
TABLE 2
DATA COLLECTION BY WEBSITES
(PERCENTAGE OF EXAMINED POPULATION OR SAMPLE)
Type of Websites Websites Websites Requiring Personal Data Feasibility of
Collecting Identification Required for False
Data Obtaining a Personal
Of Total Of Data Username or for Data
Websites Collecting Access
Websites
Public Websites 81% 50% 62% 13% 51%
. co.il 60% 56% 93% 13% 85%Private
Websites org.il 60% 45% 75% 8% 59%
Popular 93% 84% 86% 53% 67%
Websites
Sensitiveebsite 89% 84% 94% 49% 71%
,Websites
These findings point to four main conclusions. First, a high percent-
age of websites in all subcategories collect users' personal data, with
popular websites and sensitive websites at the top. This finding reaffirms
the European (and Israeli) concern with the market threat to informa-
tional privacy. Second, the results indicate a gap between the public and
private sectors; interestingly, the percentage of private sector websites
that collect personal data was significantly lower than the rate for public
websites. Third, over fifty percent of websites in all categories (except
for <org.il> sites) required some level of identification from users. Iden-
tification is most likely to be required by popular and sensitive websites
(84% of websites). Fourth, the results suggest that current mechanisms
are not effective in validating user-provided data and preventing these
users from accessing the website using false data. Among public
138. See id. (defining "information" subject to PPA regulation).
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websites, the results show the lowest percentage of websites that facili-
tated the use of false data. In addition to findings regarding data
collection practices, these results enable us to examine the websites'
prima facie compliance with the law.
C. Privacy Practices and
Compliance with Legal Requirements
In conducting a content analysis of the online privacy policies, we
sought to determine whether websites that collect data comply with the
legal requirements of the PPA. As discussed in Part H, the PPA imposes a
series of duties on data collectors and database owners or their operators:
notice, confidentiality and data security, and requirements to enable ac-
cess and rectification."' Other than the notice requirement, the data
collector is under no duty to notify the data subject of any of his rights.
Therefore, other substantial rights may remain unknown to the subject.
We sought to determine the extent to which websites in each cate-
gory disclose their information practices to users. Our objective was to
evaluate compliance with the notice requirement and examine any addi-
tional pro-privacy attitudes.
1. Notice
A website seeking to collect personal data must first notify the data
subject when data collection is intended for database storage.14 0 Notice
must take the form of an explicit public statement addressed to the sub-
ject.41 Section 11 of the PPA requires that a notice specify (1) whether
the data subject is under a legal duty to provide the data; (2) the purpose
for which the information is collected; and (3) whether the data will be
transferred to third parties and, if so, for what purpose.142 Outside of
these basic rules, the PPA does not list any requirements regarding addi-
tional content or the form or style of notice; these are left to the
discretion of the data collectors.
Accordingly, the questionnaire aimed at exploring several practices.
First, we examined "hard compliance" with the section 11 notice re-
quirement. Second, we examined "soft compliance," considering various
factors in the presentation of the notice, including presentation format
(as a privacy policy or otherwise), visibility, and related parameters.
139. Id. §§ 11-17.
140. Id. § 11.
141. See id. (requiring data collectors to provide certain types of notice to data subjects);
id. §§ 1, 3 (requiring data collectors to obtain consent and defining consent).
142. Id. § 11.
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Third, we analyzed the content of the notices to examine whether the
website provided more information than required by law.
Our content analysis also examined whether websites reserved the
right to change the privacy policies at the owner or operator's discretion.
If a website reserves this right, the mechanism of notice and consent of-
fers little in the way of a guarantee of user privacy. In other words, if the
user agrees upfront to any use of data as detailed by an adjustable pri-
vacy policy, the user does not exercise real control over the collection
and use of personal data. A high percentage of data-collecting websites
reserved the option to modify privacy policies: 69% of popular sites,
62% of sensitive sites, and 55% of commercial sites. Lower percentages
were found for public sites (26%) and org.il sites (22%).
We examined "hard compliance" by reviewing the notice under vari-
ous headings and evaluating compliance with the three sub-requirements
of section 11. The findings are summarized in Table 3.
TABLE 3
"HARD COMPLIANCE" WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT
AMONG WEBSITES THAT COLLECT PERSONAL DATA
Type of Websites Notice exists Reference to Declare Declare the Details
(% of websites existence of purpose for transfers of regarding
that collect legal duty to which data data to third third parties
data)-sec. 11 provide data is collected parties (% of those
(sec. 11(1)) (sec.11(2)) (sec.11(3)) who
transfer)
(sec. 11 (3))
Public Websites 22% 4% 28% 26% 56%'6
Private co.il 16% 12% 58% 49% 
67%
Websites org.il 19% 14% 43% 29% 17%
Popular Websites 76% 26% 65% 73% 65%1"
Sensitive Websites 56% 16% 55% 54% 71%
These findings indicate a low level of compliance with the law. The
public and private websites show an especially low level of compliance;
of the 232 public websites that collect data, only fifty provided some
143. One would expect that the data for this column was calculated according to the
number of websites declaring that they transfer data to third parties under the adjacent col-
umn. However, there were several websites that indicated the purpose of onward transfer, but
did not specify the onward transfer itself.
144. See supra text accompanying note 143.
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kind of notice. Compliance is more likely, but still low, among sensitive
websites. Popular websites present the highest level of compliance; 76%
of those that collect data provide notice. However, the vast majority of
websites that provide notice fail to follow the specific notice content re-
quirements of section 11. Compliance with the duty to notify users
whether they are under a duty to provide the data is especially low.
Compliance rates with the second prong of section 11, the duty to notify
users of the purpose for which the data is collected, were slightly higher.
Public websites were the least likely to comply (28% of the data-
collecting websites provided notice), and popular websites showed the
highest compliance levels (65%).
Compliance with the third prong. of section I1, the duty to notify
users whether the website transfers the data to third parties, is more
difficult to assess, as websites that do not include such notice may sim-
ply not transfer the data to third parties. Hence, we examined whether
the few websites that did notify users of the data transfer complied
with section 11(3), which requires the website to disclose to the user to
whom the data will be transferred. We found that compliance levels
vary. The lowest level of compliance was recorded among <org.il>
websites (17%), while there was a moderate level of compliance by
public websites (56%) and better compliance rates by the commercial
(67%), popular (65%), and sensitive (71%) websites.145
Interestingly, although some websites stated they were collecting us-
ers' personal data, we found no indication that they actually did so. This
was a puzzling result, but there are several possible explanations. First, the
website may collect data in some covert manner that we failed to detect.
Second, the websites may intend to collect such data in the future and thus
have already launched the framework for complying with legal require-
ments. A third possibility is that the website operators simply copied the
privacy notice from other websites without adapting it to their actual data
collection practices. Further research is needed to verify these hypotheses.
2. Purpose
As discussed, the PPA requires that data subjects be notified of the
purpose of data collection. This requirement implicates a core principle
of the PPA: the limited-purpose principle. Under section 2(9) of the PPA,
data collected for one purpose cannot be used for another.14 6 Section 8(b)
145. Transfer of personal data by public bodies is restricted under Chapter 4 of the PPA,
which sets specific rules and imposes further duties on public data holders. Privacy Protection
Act, § 23 (Isr.) (finding illegal certain data transfers from the Ministry to private bodies such
as banks and public bodies such as the Broadcasting Authority).
146. Privacy Protection Act, § 2 (Isr.).
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contains a similar principle regarding data held in databases.' 47 The PPA
does not state which purposes are legitimate, and it should be read to
allow all purposes not prohibited by law.148
Given the ubiquity of commercial communications today (e.g.,
spam), we determined whether the communication of commercial data
was specified as a purpose for collection of user data. At the time of the
research, commercial communications were not specifically regulated by
Israeli law. Only in 2009 was the law (the Communications Act)
amended. Hence, the Privacy Study's results provide a pre-2009 basis for
a comparative analysis with current, post-2009 compliance levels. 4 9
Less than 50% of websites indicate that they use collected data for
purposes of communication with the user. Popular websites were most
likely to collect data, with 61% stating "commercial communications" as
the purpose of the data collection in their privacy policies. In contrast,
only 8% of the data-collecting public websites declare they will use data
for the purpose of communicating with users, the lowest rate among
study websites. This last finding is plausible, as many public bodies al-
ready have substantial user data."o
Some websites that state the intention to use users' data to commu-
nicate with the users also grant users a degree of control over their data.
For example, an opt-out mechanism requires users to take steps to re-
move their information from the website's distribution lists. An opt-in
mechanism, by contrast, requires user consent before websites or third
parties can use the data for sending communications. ' While less than
50% of data-collecting websites that comply with the notice require-
ment in the public and private sectors offer users a choice regarding
future communication, a high percentage (76%) of the popular web-
sites provided users with the opportunity to make such a choice.
Unsurprisingly, most websites employed the opt-out mechanism, set-
ting a default rule under which the website can freely send materials to
users.
147. Id. § 8.
148. See CA 439/88 Database Registrar v. Ventura 48(3) PD 808 [1994] (Isr.), in which
the Supreme Court affirmed the Registrar's decision to refuse to register an illegal database.
The database at issue contained credit histories, thus violating § 2(9) of the PPA (stating that
using information regarding a person's private affairs for a purpose other than that for which
the information was provided constitutes a violation of privacy). Today, credit history services
are regulated by a special statute. See Credit Data Service Act, 5762-2002, 1825 LSI 104
(2002) (Isr.).
149. See Amendment No. 40 to Communications Act, 5742-1982, SH No. 1060, 218
(Isr.).
150. For example, the Ministry of Transportation maintains the database of all licensed
drivers, owners' of vehicles, etc., including means of communicating with them.
151. The study did not review means of providing user choice other than opt-in and opt-
out mechanisms. In some cases, we were unable to determine whether a choice was offered.
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TABLE 4
COMMUNICATIONS DATA PRACTICES
Type of Websites Data is used for communicating Opt-out choice Opt-in choice
with the user (% of websites
that collect data)
Public Websites 8% Data unreliable Data Unreliable
Private co.il 51% 42%'- 5%
Websites org.il 43% 22% 11%
Popular Websites 61% 57% 19%
Sensitive Websites 45% 41% 11%
3. Confidentiality and Data Security
A website collecting personal data is under a duty to keep the data
confidential and to provide data security.' The PPA requires that data
collectors provide data security, but they are under no legal obligation to
announce this. Nevertheless, we found that a high percentage of websites
claimed to provide data security, including 58% of sensitive websites,
55% of popular websites, and 51% of commercial websites. A substan-
tially lower number of public sites (24%) carried a statement related to
their data security. Only a small number of statements detailed the data
security measures undertaken by the website.
TABLE 5
NOTICE ABOUT DATA SECURITY MEASURES
Type of Websites Data Security Detailed Statement (% of those
Statement which have a data security
statement)
Public Websites 24% 24%
Private Websites co.il 51% 
50%
org.il 35% 44%
Popular Websites 55% 29%
Sensitive Websites 58% 34%
4. Access and Rectification Rights
Subject to several exceptions, a data subject has a legal right under
the PPA to access his data held in the database and to require the
152. Not all of the data-collecting websites which declared that data will be used for
future communication with users offered users a choice. The more interesting comparison is
the ratio of opt-out to opt-in mechanisms, with a far greater number of opt-out options.
153. Privacy Protection Act, 5741-1981, 1011 LSI 128, §§ 16-17 (1980-81) (Isr.).
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amendment or deletion of incorrect, inadequate or outdated data.'5 As
with confidentiality and data security duties, the data collector, although
required to enable access and rectification, is under no obligation to dis-
close to the user that such rights exist. We examined whether websites
nonetheless provided such information.
A low percentage of websites informed users of their rights to review
the data collected about them. The highest disclosure rates were among
popular websites (21%), followed by <org.il> websites (14%) and com-
mercial websites (10%) and sensitive websites (10%). Public websites
had the lowest disclosure rates, with only 6% notifying users of their
right to access personal data.
Similarly, only a few websites provided the means for updating data
collected on the subject, even though the right to amend personal data is
secured under the PPA. 5 Here again, the highest compliance levels were
detected among popular websites (24%), <org.il> websites (17%), sensi-
tive websites (15%), and commercial websites (1 1%). Only 7% of public
websites provided a mechanism to amend personal data.
TABLE 6
ACCESS AND RECTIFICATION RIGHTS
Type of Website Voluntary notice Mechanisms for
regarding the right to updating data
access personal data
Public Websites 6% 7%
Private Websites co.il 10% 11%
org.il 14% 17%
Popular Websites 21% 24%
Sensitive Websites 10% 15%
D. Privacy Practices: Look and Feel
A series of factors were reviewed to determine the visibility of no-
tices required by the PPA. We assumed that a notice is most visible when
it is clearly displayed under a distinctive, easily located heading. We then
examined whether the notice is displayed separately under a distinctive
title like "Privacy Policy," whether the website's homepage links to the
notice, and the prominence of the link, based both on its location on the
154. Id. §§ 13-14 (stating user access rights, exceptions for security bodies, law en-
forcement bodies, tax authorities, and anti-money laundering databases, and user rectification
rights).
155. See id. § 14.
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webpage and its overall prominence on a scale of I to 5, as discussed
below.
Heading. The results show that a vast majority of websites in all
subcategories include the notice in their Terms of Use (ToU) and bylaws:
81% of public websites, 70% of <org.il> websites, 64% of popular web-
sites, and 62% of <co.il> websites; sensitive websites came in last at
52%. Twenty-nine percent of sensitive websites displayed their privacy
policies in other ways.
TABLE 7
HEADING OF NOTICE
Type of Website Display as Display under Display under
"Privacy Policy" ToU or bylaws "data security"
Public Websites 4% 77% 2%
Private Websites co.il 12% 54% 0
org.il 8% 34% 0
Popular Websites 15% 35% 12%
Sensitive Websites 10% 42% 5%
Visibility of Link to Notice. Most websites maintained a link to the
notice on the website's homepage: 88% of popular websites, 85% of
public websites, 84% of sensitive sites, 82% of commercial websites,
and 65% of <org.il> websites.
Location of Links. Most links to the notice were located at the bot-
tom of the webpage: 90% of popular sites, 79% of sensitive websites,
89% of public websites, 73% of <org.il> websites, and 69% of <co.il>
websites.
Links'Reliability. Links to the privacy policy were almost always ac-
tive: as a whole, links were active in over 94% of websites, with 100%
reliability for public websites.
Prominence of Links to Notice. The location of information on web-
sites affects the impact of the information. Accordingly, we examined the
prominence of the links to the notice on a scale of I to 5.
156. Subjective rankings were based on the examiner's overall impression of the sites.
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TABLE 8
PROMINENCE OF LINKS TO NOTICE
[1-HIGHLY VISIBLE; 5-HARDLY NOTICEABLE]
1 2 3 4 5
Public 0% 28% 37% 24% 11%
Commercial 2% 23% 29% 27% 19%
Org.il 7% 7% 27% 53% 7%
Popular 3% 10% 63% 20% 3%
Sensitive 0% 25% 44% 19% 12%
E. Actual Privacy Practices
For a selected group of websites, the sensitive websites, we per-
formed data security testing related to some of their actual privacy
practices. The goal was to examine whether there is a gap between their
claimed policies and actual information practices. To examine the actual
information privacy practices of these websites, we designed a techno-
logical test in collaboration with Aladdin Knowledge Systems Ltd., a
data security company. The tests aimed to measure the following: track-
ing cookies used by websites, data security vulnerability, and use of
intrusive measures. The evaluation combined several approaches that
apply automatic and manual tools, including code and functionality
analysis, network traffic analysis, and manual examination.157 The
evaluation of actual information practices was performed in a controlled
157. For each of the sensitive websites, the evaluation proceeded according to the fol-
lowing steps. First, we opened the website with Internet Explorer in a controlled environment.
Second, we inspected the main page's code by reviewing the captured Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) packets with Ethereal sniffer to determine whether the main page contains any
exploits that may run malicious code. Third, we checked if the website communicated with
other websites in order to import extraneous components. This was also done using Ethereal
sniffer, which provides an option to list all such communications with displayed TCP packets
for easy review. Fourth, we surfed the website, checking the methods it used to protect users'
data and running Ethereal to determine whether it used any encryption protocol. Fifth, we
inspected the cookies that the website or third-party websites placed on our machine. Sixth,
we used LinkScanner (http://linkscanner.explabs.com) to check whether the website was hid-
ing any exploit code. This step is meant to ensure that we did not miss any malicious code
during our manual inspection of the packets captured by Ethereal sniffer. Finally, we used
Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner for two purposes: first as a crawler to determine whether
it contained any suspicious pages (if so, we inspected it carefully); second, to scan for vulner-
abilities.
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environment to ensure reliable, accurate, and comprehensive examina-
tion."'
We then compared each website's declared privacy statements with
actual privacy practices. Actual information practices of sensitive web-
sites showed poor compliance with the legal requirements. We detected a
high percentage of websites claiming to provide data security, with the
highest percentage among sensitive websites with privacy policies
(58%). However, examining the actual practices of these sensitive web-
sites revealed that the vast majority did not provide any sort of data
security.
While there is no legal obligation to report which data security
measures are undertaken, and no obligation to report the use of cookies,
24% of the sensitive websites provided users with a notice about the use
of cookies although none mentioned the use of "third-party cookies."
The tests of actual information practices showed that about 90% of sen-
sitive websites used cookies and about 25% also used third-party
cookies.
Finally, about 50% of sensitive websites linked to applications on
other websites which in some cases collected data from the website us-
ers.
F. Understanding Compliance and Disobedience
The study demonstrates the marginal role of data protection regula-
tion in shaping the online privacy environment. The findings show a high
level of data collection and a low level of compliance with legal re-
quirements. A closer look at these findings, however, reveals interesting
variants in actual responses to different legal measures. It further reveals
some notable discrepancies between the different sectors. These findings
are discussed below.
1. Data Collection. The first significant finding is that websites rou-
tinely collect personal data from users. This is of no surprise to anyone
who studies data collection practices on the Internet. Nevertheless, users
often do not fully realize the extent to which websites collect data. Pri-
vacy awareness surveys conducted in the last decade have found that
users are suspicious and fear that their privacy is violated online, espe-
cially when providing data on their credit cards. However, the main
concern that users express is that their privacy will be violated by third
158. The environment consisted of Windows XP and Internet Explorer 6.0 (IE) installed
on a VMware machine in addition to Ethereal sniffer installed on the host machine to observe
the network traffic of the guest OS (Operating System) installed on the VMware. The tools
used to accomplish the evaluation were Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0 (default configura-
tion), Ethereal Sniffer, VMware, Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner and LinkScanner.
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parties, such as hackers and identity thieves. As our lives go digital, it is
increasingly clear that data is continuously collected by almost all web-
sites. Our study indicated that this warning is especially applicable to
popular and sensitive websites and, to a lesser degree, public websites.
Another striking finding is the high level of non-compliance among
public websites. This finding suggests that the state is still a major threat
to the privacy of citizens. The findings further indicate that the practice
of collecting data is slightly lower among commercial and organization
websites than in other groups.
2. Identification. The study shows that roughly half of public and
private sector websites ask for identification, making it a prevalent prac-
tice among those websites that collect data. This practice is used more
often by the popular and sensitive websites. The commercial and popular
websites tend to require identification as a precondition for accessing the
website or acquiring services. It is not surprising that a high percentage
of interactive websites, which by their nature collect information, require
identification. The collection of identifying data has commercial motiva-
tions; for example, it might be necessary for facilitating online
payments. In other cases it is part of the website's business model, where
the website provides a useful service "for free" in exchange for user-
identifying data. Such identifying data could be valuable to the website
itself or sold to third parties. Another possible explanation for the preva-
lence of the identification requirement is that websites collect identifying
data as a precaution against potential liability for injurious behavior by
users (i.e., posting defamatory statements or materials that infringe copy-
rights).
The findings show that a substantial number of websites requiring
identification do not verify this data. The evidence on the feasibility of
false personal data is striking.160 Providing false personal data is a form
of resistance, a user self-help measure for protecting one's rights (al-
though it may also facilitate abuses)."' The current study did not
159. This latter finding can be explained by the diverse composition of the <co.il> and
<org.il> groups. The <co.il> and <org.il> categories are loosely defined by the allocation of
domain names. See Rules for the Allocation of Domain Names, supra note 122, at 3.2. Conse-
quently, while other categories require the satisfaction of some formal criteria (i.e., a license
or a legal status), the <co.il> and <org.il> categories function as a default. Therefore, these
groups are likely to be less homogenous and to include strictly commercial entities alongside
smaller NGOs and personal websites. We assume that NGOs and personal websites are less
likely to engage in data collection. The differences among these entities are likely to mitigate
the final outcome. Further research could verify this hypothesis by differentiating these sub-
groups and studying their practices separately.
160. See supra Table 2.
161. For resistance practices in the context of privacy, see John Gilliom, Struggling with
Surveillance: Resistance, Consciousness, and Identity, in THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEIL-
LANCE AND VISIBILITY 111, 111-29 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson eds., 2006).
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systematically measure whether users actually take advantage of this
option. Further research is needed on users' behavior regarding the pro-
vision of false data.162
The law plays only a minor role and does not intervene directly in
the domain of identification requirements. The PPA authorizes websites
to request data, but it does not prohibit users from providing false data.'63
The only legal issues at stake lie at the background of this practice: web-
sites are subject to the general notice requirement, and users might be
required, in some cases, to provide correct data under general principles
of private law (such as good faith in negotiation and pre-contractual rela-
tions, and the general prohibition of fraud).'64
3. Notice Compliance. Not surprisingly, the findings on compliance
with the strict notice requirements of the PPA indicate that compliance is
rather low. 65
The level of compliance also varies among different sectors. While
compliance among public and private sector websites was relatively low,
ranging from 16% to 22%, popular and sensitive websites had substan-
tially higher compliance rates, with popular websites showing the lowest
number of violations. With over 80% of public websites collecting per-
sonal data, low compliance among public bodies raises serious concerns.
The high level of compliance among popular websites is particularly
interesting. The popular websites are generally owned by major corpora-
tions. These corporations most likely retain competent legal advice and
are more informed about potential legal exposure. This suggests that pri-
vacy regulation is more effective at shaping the behavior of commercial
162. Relevant factors might include the knowledge and technological sophistication of
users and social norms regarding the use of such websites. Thus, for example, a user who is
not aware of the collection of data or its meaning, is aware but not concerned, is not opposed
to data collection, or is simply naive, is less likely to attempt to use false data.
163. Privacy Protection Act, 5741-1981, 1011 LSI 128, § 11 (1980-81) (lsr.). Of course,
other laws prohibit deceit and impersonation. See, e.g., Criminal Act, 5738-1977 (1977) (lsr.).
164. A false statement of fact by users may violate the legal duty to act in good faith in
negotiating a contract. See The Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, § 12 (1973) (Isr.).
This may also give rise to tort liability for negligent misrepresentation under § 35 or fraud
under § 56 of the Tort Ordinance. Tort Ordinance (New Version), 5728-1968 (1968) (Isr.).
165. A caveat is in order here. Our methodology aimed at identifying the websites that
collected personal data. We tagged several activities as collection of data and excluded those
which seemed to collect only contact data and would therefore not be regarded as databases
subject to the notice requirement under the PPA. However, we were unable to determine
whether the websites also retained the data, in which case they may qualify as databases, as
defined by the PPA. However, if the data is deleted immediately after the transaction or act
(for example, search engine queries that are not retained), no database is formed. Privacy
Protection Act, § 7 (Isr.) (definition of "database"). We assume that the latter situation is rare,
as it is well known that such data is retained for at least some time. For further discussion of
voluntary data retention by online players, see Kristine Laudadio Devine, Searching for Pri-
vacy Online: Legislating Against the Retention of Search Histories, (March 2007)
(unpublished draft), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? bstract-id= I 11378.
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players. Compliance with the notice requirement is virtually free, but
with a nearly complete lack of enforcement, noncompliance is also vir-
tually free.'" As long as there is little enforcement and minimal
deterrence, it is not surprising that the notice requirement is not fol-
lowed. This may further explain the failure of public websites to comply,
despite the expectation that public bodies would adhere to clear statutory
instructions rather than being motivated by economic incentives.
Another possible explanation for high compliance levels among
popular websites is their greater sensitivity to demand among users. A
notice to potential users may communicate professionalism, legitimacy,
and trustworthiness-all standard marketing tools.
By closely examining the PPA's requirements, we are able to reach
conclusions regarding these higher compliance levels. The findings as to
compliance with the PPA's first requirement, that notice to users include
whether the user has a legal duty to provide data, are particularly impor-
tant.167 The Israeli law's direct reference to the existence of a legal duty is
unique; other jurisdictions have more elaborate duties related to such
notice.16 This requirement is also less intuitive than the other require-
ments, and less likely to be inferred by simply browsing privacy policies
posted online. Hence, we assume that those websites that complied re-
ceived legal advice regarding compliance with the PPA. Compliance
levels with this sub-requirement were the lowest of all three sub-
requirements of section II .169 Again, the compliance rate for popular
websites was the highest of all groups, but objectively low, with only
26% of the collecting websites referring to this prong of section 11.1'0 In
addition to general enforcement failures, the low compliance rate may be
explained by the potential for negative impact of such notices on the data
subject's behavior. If a data subject is told that she is under no legal duty
to provide the data, she may not provide the requested information, or
even worse, may become suspicious of the data-collecting process alto-
gether.
Another possible explanation acknowledges that section 11(1) notice
requirements are uncommon. Drafters of website notices, knowing that
166. See supra notes 144-148 and accompanying text.
167. See Privacy Protection Act, § 11(1) (Isr.).
168. Other data protection jurisdictions, namely the EU, require that when data is col-
lected from the data subjects, the data collector must inform the subject, inter alia, of
"whether replies to the questions are obligatory or voluntary, as well as the possible conse-
quences of failure to reply." See Data Protection Directive, supra note 17, art. 10(c). This
requirement is qualified by language limiting the obligation "in so far as such further informa-
tion is necessary, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the data are collected,
to guarantee fair processing in respect of the data subject." Id.
169. See Privacy Protection Act, § II (Isr.).
170. See id. § 11(l).
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the requirement is not made in other jurisdictions, may not feel obliged
to include it in the notice. We suspect that some of these notices are sim-
ply copied from foreign websites, and it is likely that the language of the
notice is the outcome of independent legal analysis and tailored to the
particular needs of the website in only a small number of cases. Further
empirical research is needed to explore this issue.
The central finding of the Privacy Study is that many Israeli websites
that collect data routinely violate the law. These websites frequently ig-
nore their obligation to state whether there is a legal duty to provide the
data. Furthermore, when categories of websites are compared, public
websites complied at the lowest rates, and popular websites at the high-
est.
The lack of compliance is not surprising, but the clear gap between
public websites and the other categories of websites, particularly popular
websites, is an intriguing finding. Israeli data protection law aims at both
sources of harm to individual privacy: the state and the market. It is
popular to argue that the market poses no less a threat to personal data
than the government. Indeed, our findings indicate that private websites,
especially popular ones, are more likely to collect personal data and are
slightly less willing to accept false data compared to the other website
categories, including public websites. However, at the same time, popu-
lar websites are more likely to comply with formal legal requirements.
These findings lead us to propose a concrete practical policy recommen-
dation to the Israeli DPA (Data Protection Authority): in order to address
privacy and compliance failures among public sector websites, the DPA
should design an enforcement mechanism that is tailored for public
players.
4. Notice Accessibility. Data protection law in general and the Israeli
PPA in particular place a high importance on notice as a basis for a
user's autonomous decision, which is based in turn on the concept of
informed consent. Accordingly, when a user knowingly agrees to provide
personal data for a particular use, there is no privacy violation. Current
law elaborates some elements of the content of the notice but is silent
regarding its accessibility. We studied the way websites present the no-
tice, including the heading, location on the website, and prominence. A
substantial number of websites placed the notice under the general terms
of use or bylaws, with only a few in each category using the explicit title
"Privacy Policy." This is not a violation of the PPA, but it does indicate
that website owner/operators either do not appreciate the benefit of a
separate heading or have deliberately avoided providing one. Links to
the notice were usually located at the bottom of webpages, resulting in
generally lower prominence ratings.
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This finding leads to the following conclusions. First, the notice re-
quirement fails to perform its purpose. A statement buried in legalese-
heavy "Terms of Use" text at the bottom of a webpage is unlikely to
provide a data subject with sufficient information to make an informed
decision about providing personal data. A broad reading of the PPA,
drawing on its purposes, suggests that the law regulates not only the con-
tent of the notice, but also its form. Consumer protection laws provide a
useful example of such detailed regulation by explicitly specifying the
necessary format of particular notices, such as the font size of certain
notices."' With the growth of interest in behavioral law and economics,172
it is not surprising that reform initiatives increasingly focus on rules re-
sponding to various cognitive failures."' Regulating the heading,
location, and prominence of the notice may achieve greater visibility and
more meaningful informed consent by users. Of course, such regulation
may encounter constitutional difficulties due to interference with the
website's property, freedom of speech, and, at least in Israel, freedom of
-174occupation.
5. Additional Content. The notices reviewed by the Privacy Study
were notable not only for what they unlawfully failed to include but also
for what they voluntarily did include. As discussed in Part II, the PPA
requires data collectors to conform to certain core principles (e.g., notice
and consent), and to carry out several duties, such as providing access
171. See, e.g., Consumer Protection Act, 5741-1981, 1023 LSI 248, § 4A (1981) (Isr.)
(authorizing the Minister of Commerce to set the size of fonts in standard form contracts).
172. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13 (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 2000); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Deci-
sions, in PREFERENCES, BELIEF AND SIMILARITY: SELECTED WRITINGs 593 (Eldar Shafir ed.,
2003) (demonstrating the effects of psychological principles, which govern the framing of
choice, on preferences).
173. See, e.g., John C. Anderson et al., The Mitigation of Hindsight Bias in Judges'
Evaluation of Auditor Decisions, AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY, Fall 1997, at 20 (reporting
on a study of hindsight bias among professionally trained judges and arguing that that tort
reform is necessary if hindsight bias cannot be mitigated); Richard M. Hynes, Overoptimism
and Overborrowing, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 127 (2004) (discussing the legal implications for
bankruptcy law of a cognitive failure related to overoptimism regarding the risks consumers
are facing). Consumer protection laws that require a minimum font size in standard form con-
tracts or certain notices to be printed on separate pages are other examples of legal rules that
respond to common cognitive failures or insufficient attention to detail. See, e.g., Consumer
Protection Act, § 4A (Isr.) (authorizing the Minister of Commerce to issue regulations con-
cerning display and font size in standard form contracts).
174. Israel has no written constitution, but these rights and liberties are protected by a set
of basic laws which are superior to other laws, and on several occasions the High Court of
Justice has invalidated legislation contradicting the Basic Laws. The freedom of occupation is
protected under the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754-1994 SH No. 1454 (Isr.), while
freedom of speech and the right to property are protected under Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391, § 2, 3 (Isr.).
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and rectification rights and maintaining confidentiality and data secu-
rity."' However, the PPA does not require that data collectors announce
how they comply with these duties or how the subjects' rights may be
exercised. Nevertheless, a substantial number of websites that collect
data provide users with information about data security measures, in-
cluding over half of the sensitive, popular, and commercial websites
(58%, 55%, and 51% respectively) but less than a quarter of public web-
sites (24%).
A smaller number of websites informed users of their access and rec-
tification rights although not required to do so under the PPA. Popular
websites are most likely to have such information available. One possi-
ble explanation is that these websites are also using samples of standard
privacy policies posted on major (primarily U.S.) websites. Similar ac-
cess and rectification provisions are prominent in privacy policy
models."'
III. RAMIFICATIONS
The overall picture that emerges from these findings is one in which
the law plays a marginal role. This Part discusses the meaning of these
findings, focusing on implications in privacy policy and data protection
regulation in the context of other attempts to regulate online behavior.
A. Data Protection Regulation
The empirical study of Israeli websites carries broader lessons for
data protection regulation. The law does not appear to play an important
role in shaping website behavior and privacy practices. The varied results
across categories of websites suggest additional relevant factors, espe-
cially with respect to market forces. The owner/operators of commercial
websites that ask users to provide sensitive data are aware of user con-
cerns. Hence, to reassure users, the website declares that it safeguards
the data.
175. See Privacy Protection Act, §§ 13-14, 16-17 (Isr.).
176. For example, TRUSTe, a leading privacy seal company, offers guidelines for web-
sites' privacy policies:
Access to Personally Identifiable Information: If your personally identifiable infor-
mation changes, or if you no longer desire our service, you may [correct, update,
delete or deactivate it] by making the change on our member information page [or
by emailing our Customer Support at EMAIL ADDRESS] or by contacting us by
telephone or postal mail at the contact information listed below.
TRUSTe Guidance on Model Web Site Disclosures, TRUSTE, http://www.truste.org/
docs/ModelPrivacyPolicyDisclosures.doc (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
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One possible conclusion is that we should take the law out of the
picture, as it intervenes unnecessarily where market forces provides suf-
ficient redress. In this view, competition among websites may guarantee
a sufficient level of data security. A different approach would require that
websites that collect data and operate under a duty to provide data secu-
rity also provide a statement to that effect. Such a statement can have
legal implications: a website that falsely claims to have undertaken cer-
tain data security measures can be sued not only for breach of duty, but
also for false representation."'7 This is the basis of governmental regula-
tion of personal data in the United States, where the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) lacks power to regulate data protection matters di-
rectly, but has authority to regulate with respect to false representation.7 8
The findings shed doubt on the efficacy of the notice requirements
and their contents and, more generally, on the notice and consent regime.
The low level of compliance with notice requirements may call for con-
sideration of a hands-off legal strategy. The market and other factors may
provide better mechanisms for securing online privacy."'9 An alternative
would be to search for better regulatory mechanisms, perhaps strength-
ening and enhancing the legal requirements to include more detail about
what should appear in the notice and how it should be presented, and
accompanying these enhanced requirements with effective private and
public enforcement.
Is the law completely irrelevant? We submit that it is not. First, as
our findings indicate, there are substantial levels of compliance with the
existing legal privacy regime.
In the United States, data protection law plays another role. Given
the prominence of the "reasonable expectations" test within U.S. privacy
law,m concrete regulations help shape these expectations. This has a
circular effect. The fact that the law requires certain measures has a large
effect on data subjects' expectations and, of course, the reasonability of
expectations. The lack of any regulation might indicate that there are no
such expectations or that certain expectations are unreasonable. Put
differently, when a court has to determine whether certain asserted
177. The cause of action for breach of duty can be found either in contract law or negli-
gence law, if harm is caused. The obligation to avoid false representations is found in the
Consumer Protection Act, § 2 (Isr.).
178. Since there is no general U.S. federal law that requires privacy protection measures,
the FTC can only enforce privacy rules indirectly. A corporation that states that it provides a
privacy-related measure and fails to actually provide it can be investigated for false represen-
tation. Thus, the FTC indirectly protects substantive privacy norms. See Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006).
179. The strongest defense for this proposition is provided in FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN
PERSPECTIVE See supra note 53.
180. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967).
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expectations are reasonable, the existence of a statute that addresses the
matter at stake might in itself serve as an indication of reasonableness.
Our findings regarding disparate compliance levels across categories
of websites are particularly interesting."" The low level of compliance
among public websites is striking. In fact, some legal regimes assume
that the threat to privacy arises from administrative bodies. At the same
time, however, comparing the higher level of compliance among large
commercial websites (popular, sensitive) with private sector websites
may.provide insight into the mechanisms affecting online compliance.
Data security regulation is perhaps most effective under commercial en-
terprises, which are more likely to obtain legal counsel and therefore
more likely to identify the legal requirements and respond to potential
legal liability. Commercial enterprises are generally more risk averse;
they are highly visible, have deep pockets, and are more likely to be
drawn into expensive litigation.
As suggested above, commercial players might be motivated by an
existing demand among users for privacy reassurances. This explanation
is supported by findings of over-compliance among commercial web-
sites. Thus, market forces, and not the law, may play a dominant role in
shaping the behavior of online players.
Moreover, the regulatory approach is less effective with small enter-
prises or individual users, neither of which can afford the sophisticated
legal counsel that is often required for establishing a data protection pol-
icy. These websites are also affected, to an apparently much lesser
extent, by market forces.
This finding is troubling given the growing role of individuals and
small enterprises in the Web 2.0 environment. 2 As individual users in-
creasingly move to the forefront of news reporting in blogs, micro-blogs,
and online forums, or operate small online businesses, they too begin to
collect data on fellow users. The low level of compliance with current
regulations among individuals is particularly alarming given the increas-
ing threats to the privacy of users in social networks and the social
181. See supra Part Ill.
182. See OECD, Participative Web: User-Created Content (2007), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/14/38393115.pdf. For further discussion of the rise of individual
users as major players in the information environment, see generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM
99-106 (2006); CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING
WITHOUT ORGANIZATION 25-54 (2008); and Niva Elkin-Koren, User-Generated Platforms, in
WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Ill (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al.
eds., 2010).
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web.' A major threat to users' privacy is posed by information they
share on social networks without being fully aware of privacy conse-
quences. 4 Moreover, the social web encourages users to share
information about their friends and acquaintances by publicizing lists of
social connections, posting personal photos, publicly sharing informa-
tion regarding private events and experiences, and actively linking and
using private information provided by others. These major developments
suggest that public action to secure privacy in this environment may re-
quire different measures. Moreover, our research findings suggest that
data protection regulation may be unable to create a single legal measure
that fits all online privacy concerns, including these emerging threats.
B. Online Regulation
The findings also address the interconnection between law and tech-
nology, suggesting that laws aiming to regulate online behavior should
be attentive to the inherently dynamic nature of the information envi-
ronment.
First, the findings bring to the surface some of the underlying as-
sumptions of the legal regime regarding the architecture of the
information environment and the ways in which it may threaten privacy.
The introduction of digital technology created new opportunities for col-
lecting and processing data-opportunities that threaten individual
privacy in the information era. The challenge for policymakers is how to
address threats to privacy posed by information processing systems.
These new technological capabilities necessitated the expansion of legal
measures protecting physical privacy to cover personal data and enable
individuals to exercise some control over personal information. Indeed,
the data protection legal regime described in Part II assumed a particular
architecture where information is collected by large-scale enterprises
(the state or commercial entities) that could threaten individual privacy.
Our findings show, however, that while such a regime might be relatively
effective for regulating the behavior of larger commercial enterprises, it is
less effective for regulating the non-commercial private sector. This sug-
gests that the regulatory approach of data protection may prove
inadequate, as the information environment has become more diffuse.
New threats to privacy emerge in dispersed systems and are often created
183. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REv. 1137 (2009) (argu-
ing that social networks, such as Facebook, facilitate peer-to-peer privacy violations, with
users harming other users' privacy interests).
184. See, e.g., Lilian Edwards & Ian Brown, Data Control and Social Networks: Irrec-
oncilable Ideas?, in HARBORING DATA: INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW AND THE CORPORATION
202 (Andrea M. Matwyshyn ed., 2009).
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by individuals and small groups with a growing ability to collect and
process information (e.g., bloggers).'" This may require regulators to
adjust current legal strategies to the new architecture. As long as regula-
tion is targeted primarily to commercial enterprises, it may fail to
achieve its purpose.
Moreover, new technologies often destabilize fundamental legal
concepts, requiring lawmakers to reconsider the rationales underlying a
regulatory framework. 8 6 The legal regime that seeks to allow individuals
to control the collection and processing of personal data assumes that
individual users value such control or, at the very least, would have val-
ued it more had they known and understood the implications of
providing such data. Our findings show that in the data security context,
websites independently react to the demands of consumers.17 Such de-
mands often result in better compliance with data protection standards
and with standards higher than those required by law. By analogy, in
websites with lower compliance levels, one might infer that individuals
simply do not care about the collection of their data or the transfer of
that data to third parties, or perhaps that they are unaware of, or do not
fully comprehend, the privacy threats. If users know, understand, or care
about their personal data, websites are more likely to compete in provid-
ing appropriate privacy policies to attract more users. As the information
environment becomes a greater part of everyday life, shifts in privacy
preferences are likely to continue.'88 For example, users of social net-
works such as Facebook willingly share colossal amounts of personal
data and intimate details about their personal affairs.'" Thus, a second
issue that must be considered in adjusting the data protection regime to
the dynamic information environment is whether the law is the best tool
for facilitating personal privacy.
A final point is that sometimes the architecture effectively deter-
mines the extent to which rights are protected. Our findings show that
although a large number of websites required the submission of personal
information as a prerequisite for obtaining access or services, the ability
of users to provide false data enabled them to protect against unwar-
ranted invasion of their privacy. This suggests that privacy regulators
may need to focus not only on legal requirements but also on promoting
an open infrastructure and enabling means of self-help. Such policies
185. See supra notes 183-184 and accompanying text.
186. Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli Salzberger, The Economic Analysis of Cyberspace: Chal-
lenges Posed by Cyberspace to Legal Theory and Legal Rules, 19 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 553
(2000).
187. See supra Part II.
188. Omer Tene, Privacy: The New Generations, I INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 15 (2011).
189. See Edwards & Brown, supra note 184.
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should aim at facilitating privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) and
educating users about the risks and opportunities they face online.
CONCLUSION
Privacy has never been a clear legal concept. As our lives move in-
creasingly to the online environment, the future of privacy is more
mysterious than ever. Cultural trends, social pressure, and new technolo-
gies pull us-or perhaps push us-towards sharing more personal data
with others. Our friends in the social network are interested in such data,
but so are corporations and governments. This Article focused on the
category of privacy in personal data, or informational privacy, in the
digital environment. The changing landscape of the online environment
will affect the boundaries between the private and the public, and change
our views and expectations regarding the privacy of our personal data.
These changes, however, are beyond the scope of this Article. Once
we-as a society-make the decision that we care about our online pri-
vacy, the policy and legal challenge is to figure out the best way to
address this issue. One option, thus far undertaken by the United States,
is to leave the regulation of online privacy to the market, though with
certain constraints on governmental use of the data and some targeted
sectoral regulation. An alternative approach, exemplified by the Euro-
pean Union, is to create a robust regulatory regime. As governments
consider which route to take and how improve existing policy, more data
is needed to assess the pros and cons of these approaches.
This Article provided an empirical study of a legal system that emu-
lates the European model-the Israeli data protection law. The research
presented in Part II examined the application and compliance of the law
in practice. We found that some areas of the law are simply irrelevant in
the daily practices of websites, and that there are clearly other forces at
play, namely market forces and dynamic social norms. The findings af-
firm the concern that privacy is threatened not only by Big Brother but
by market players as well. However, these market players often demon-
strate better compliance with the law than other players, and far better
compliance than the state actors. Large corporate players also respond
better to data protection regulation than non-market players such as
NGOs, individual users, and small businesses. These findings are par-
ticularly informative for policymakers given the recent transformation of
the online environment, the rise of the social web, and the centrality of
individual users and uncoordinated crowds. At the end of the day, in de-
signing a privacy policy, all of these factors should be taken into
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consideration, with special attention to the interplay between the law,
technology, and evolving norms.
